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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the “Notice on cooperation between
national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty” (the “Notice”), which the Commission of the European Community (the “Commission”) published in 1993.
Among the topics covered by the Notice the following deserve a closer analysis: the Commission’s
enforcement policy, the Commission’s views on the application of Articles 85 and 86 by national
courts, and the cooperation between national courts and the Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the
"Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty" (the
"Notice"),' which the Commission of the European Community
(the "Commission") published in 1993. However, before recal* A version of this Article will be published in 1993 FoPD.DAM CoiP. L. INST. (Barry

E. Hawk ed., 1994). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1994.
** Advokaat, Partner Baker & McKenzie, Brussels. Professor, College of Europe,
Bruges, Belgium.
1. Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in Apply-
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ling certain elements of European Community ("EC") law in the
application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty ("Article 85"
and "Article 86") by national courts in EC Member States, some
facts and figures should first be examined.
This paper does not address the parallel application of national competition law, the application by national courts of
competition clauses of international agreements entered into by
the European Community, the implications for national courts
of the EEC Merger Control Regulation, the special rules for public enterprises (Art. 90/2/EEC), or European Coal and Steel
Community competition law, as these topics are not covered by

the Notice.
A. Preliminay Facts and Figures
The following table lists the number of cases in which national courts expressly enforced Article 85 or Article 86:2

Belgium
Germany
Denmark
Spain
France
United Kingdom
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Portugal

1989
9
11
23
10
3
1
-

3
1 61

1990
7

1991
4

10
2
1
17
1
4
6

9

1992
3

1993
-

5
2
2.
1

3
-,
1
-

1
4
2
2

-

-

1
1
--

1

-

-

-

5
2
36

-

-

-

-

-

-

22

15

-

4

ing Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, O.J. C 39/6 (1993) [hereinafter Commission

Notice].
2. Figures compiled by the author from unpublished work done by the Research
and Documentation Division, Court ofJustice of the European Communities, Survey of
Over 10,000 Judgements of National Courts, 1993 (on file with the European Community Court ofJustice). These figures are not exhaustive. The author is indebted to the
staff of the Research and Documentation Division of the Court of Justice for their
prompt and invaluable assistance.
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This table does not purport to be entirely complete, as quite a
few judgements remain unreported. This article does not deal
with the role Articles 85 or 86 played in these cases. In fact, little
is known about the degree of enforcement of EC competition
law by national courts. 3 The Commission has asked a group of
independent experts to carry out a study. A preliminary draft is
being examined by the Commission's Directorate General for
Competition and has not yet been made publicly available. Even
if one were to multiply these figures by three, they would still be
remarkably low when compared to the activities of the Commission. The following table illustrates how much more active the
Commission is in EC competition law.4
1989
Notifications
206
Complaints
93
Own initiative proceedings
67
Files closed
428

1990 1991
201 282
97
83
77
23
868 835

1992
246
110
43
729

1993
(until 11/08)
172
73
23
-

The data on enforcement by national courts and by the
Commission obviously represent only the tip of the iceberg. The
Commission no longer needs to be notified of many restrictive
agreements as a result of eleven "block exemption" regulations.
Figures are not available, but experience suggests that businessmen, when made aware of the situation, are willing to have their
agreements drafted so as to come under a "block exemption"
and hereby benefit from an exemption without having to go
through the process of notification. On the other hand, this
may be counterbalanced by the fact that businessmen often take
3. See generaUy Editorial Comments, 30 COMMON MiT. L. REv. 681, 684 (1993) (stating little is known about enforcement of Community competition law by national

courts).
4. See COMMISSION NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 55,

36 (1990)

(figures for 1989); COMMISSION TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 111,

91

(1991) (figures for 1990); COMMISSION TWENTIETH-FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POuIcY 60, 1 73 (1992) (figures for 1991); COMMISSION TWENTIETH-SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 80,
126 (1993) (figures for 1992). For 1993, figures are available
from the Commission's Directorate General for Competition, Brussels, Belgium.
5. "Block exemption" is a term of art that refers to regulations whereby the EC
Commission declares that the provisions of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty do not
apply to certain categories of agreements.
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risks and do not notify the Commission of restrictive agreements. They often do so with impunity because their business
partners seldom complain to the Commission.
The usual explanation as to why there is relatively little civil
litigation implicating Articles 85 and 86 in national courts involves a number of factors, such as the cost of national proceedings, the absence of adequate remedies in some jurisdictions,6
the lack of familiarity with EC competition rules, and the prevailing culture and philosophy of the judiciary and the parties themselves.
It is doubtful whether the last two factors, which played a
role in the past, are still significant. Competition law is probably
the area of EC law with the highest visibility and on which most
has been written. Moreover, in EC Member States, "[t] he process
of spontaneous, autonomous legal alignment through the adoption of legal rules modelled on Articles 85 and 86 is... continuing,"7 which indicates a large measure of political acceptance
throughout the EC of the value of the competition rules established in the EEC Treaty.
Attempting to explain the benign neglect that characterizes
parties' approaches to the enforcement of EC competition law in
national courts, a distinguished writer recently listed the following five factors:
(1) Factfinding.the capacity of national courts to obtain and
review documents, and to assess relevant facts adequately, varies widely and is virtually non-existent in some jurisdictions.
(2) Different rules on nullity underArticle 85(2): the civil consequences of nullity are not the same throughout the EC.
(3) The opportunitiesfor obtaining interim relief. these opportunities vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
(4) The right to damages: damages awarded on the basis of an
infringement of Article 85 and Article 86 are available in limited, and different, circumstances.
(5) Divergent attitudes to costs: there are three principal systems: (i) the losing party bears the successful party's costs; (ii)
the losing party can be ordered to pay part of the successful
party's legal fees; and (iii) each party is required to bear its
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Goh, Enforcing EC Competition Law in Member States, 3 EUR.

COMPE-

TrriON L. REV. 114 (1993) (describing situation in United Kingdom).

7. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The ContributionofEC Competition Policy to the Single Market, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 257, 258 (1992).
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own costs. 8
Further research would be needed to establish a correlation
between these differing approaches and the variations in enforcement per Member State. One should probably add to these
factors the burden of proof, which, at least in some jurisdictions,9 is higher than that involved in complaining to the Commission. The Commission will do a substantial part of the factfinding itself. The parties may prefer to rely on national competition rules (if any) in national courts to avoid the need to show
that trade between Member States is affected.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW ON ENFORCEMENT OF EC
COMPETITIONRULES
It may be helpful to recall EC law relating to the enforcement of EC competition law by national courts as it stands. It is
within the constraints of these rules that the Notice was drafted.
A. General Aspects of EC Competition Law
Turning to EC law, there are two general aspects to be considered. First, there is a particular system of division of responsibilities between the EC and its Member States, between the EC
courts and the national courts, and, in the area of competition
law, between the Commission and national courts. Up to now,
the day-to-day implementation of EC law has been left to Member States, which act within the framework of their own legislation. There are some departures from this system, such as the
implementation of competition rules. Implementing regulations, however, provide that Member State authorities have the
power to apply Article 85 (1) and Article 86 as long as the Commission has not initiated proceedings.1" The EC courts have
only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on them by the
8. David Hall, Enforcement &y National Courts, in
E.C.

AND

PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN

U.S. COMPETITION LAws (P.J. Slot & A. McDonnell eds. 1993). Hall mentions

two additional factors: divergent approaches to Article 177 references and different
rules relating to arbitration. Id. These, however, explain inconsistent enforcement
rather than the low level of enforcement of EC competition rules.
9. See, e.g., Wulf-Henning Roth, The Application of Community Law in West Germany:
1980- 1990, 28 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 137, 172 (1991) (discussing burden of proof in
Germany).
10. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(3), 13 J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 89.
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various EC treaties: they have no "subject matter jurisdiction.""
Therefore, it is not enough for a dispute the adjudication of
which involves a question of EC law to be subjected to this jurisdiction. The common law judge of EC law is the national judge.
Second, there are no provisions in the EEC Treaty concerning the enforcement of EC law by national courts. Despite the
fact that the sometimes divergent approaches of Member States'
procedural laws may hinder the enforcement of EC law, 12 there
is an obvious reluctance to address in the EC framework issues of
judicial organizaiion in Member States. When lawyers discuss
this topic they usually consider that it should be dealt with by
agreements negotiated between Member States.' The Court of
Justice has taken the view that:
Articles 100 to 102... of the Treaty enable the appropriate
steps to be taken as necessary, to eliminate differences between the provisions laid down ...by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States if these differences are
found to be such as to cause distortion
or to affect the func14
tioning of the common market.
In Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v.
Hauptzollamt Kiel (the Butterbuying Cruises case),15 the Court of
Justice stated that the Treaty "was not intended to create new
remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of
Community law other than those already laid down by national
law."' 6 Apart from the 1968 Convention on Judicial Compe11. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, arts. 177-183, Mar.
25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 76-78 (1958) (conferring jurisdiction) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
12. See, e.g., Peter Oliver, Le Droit Communautaire et les voies de recours nationales,
CAHIERS DE Dgorr EUROPtEN 348 (1992); see also Ami Barav, Enforcement of Community

Rights in the NationalCourts: The CaseforJurisdictionto GrantAn Interim Relief, 26 COMMON
MKr.L. RkEv. 369 (1989).
13. See, e.g.,J. Mertens de Wilmars, Rapporteur General, Federation Internationale
de Droit Europ~en, L'Eicacitedes differentes techniques nationalesde protectionjuridiquecontra les violations du droit communautairepar les
autonites nationaleset les
particuliers,1 REMEDIES FOR BRYACH OF COMMUNry LAw 1.1, 1.38 (1980).
14. Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043,
2053, 14, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 551. The same language is used in a judgement
handed down on the same day. Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Landwirtschaftskammer ffir das Saarland, Case 33/76 [1976] E.C.R. 1989, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. 533.
15. Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt
Kiel, Case 158/80 [1981] E.C.R. 1805, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 449.
16. Id. at 1838, 1 44, [1982] 1 C.M.L.I. at 483.
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tence and Enforcement ofJudgements 1'7 (and a few ad-hoc provisions on particular aspects to be found in EC secondary legislation), these issues have so far not been dealt with either in agreements between Member States or in EC legislation. The only
exception in the EEC Treaty is Article 85(2), which states that
agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to Article 85(1) are

automatically void."' Practically, the only case law is that of the
Court of Justice.
B. EC Law Enforcement by National Courts
The Court ofJustice has developed a series of general principles or rules that clarify the duty to ensure full operation of EC
law for Member States and national courts under Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty. 9 The following appear particularly relevant to the
topic of this paper:
" Equality of treatment of legal actions to enforce EC
law and those to enforce national law.20
" National rules may not be such as to make the exercise of rights granted by the EC legal system practically impossible. 2 '
" National courts must set aside a rule of national law
preventing "a court seised of a dispute governed by
[EC] law from granting interim relief in order to ensure full effectiveness of the judgement to be given
on the existence of the rights claimed under [EC]
22
law."
" Member States have the duty to ensure that infringements of EC law are penalized under conditions,
both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national
law of a similar nature and importance, and which
17. 1968 Convention on Judicial Competence and Enforcement of Judgements,
O.J. L 304/77 (1978).
18. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(2), 298-U.N.T.S. at 46-47.
19. See Koen Lenaerts, Rechtsbescherming en rechtsafdwinging. deffuncties van de rechter
in HET EUROPEES GEMEENSCHAPSRECHT 181 (Mys & Breesch, Gent 1993) (identifying
seven such principles or rules).
20. See Rewe-Handelsgeselschafl, [1981] E.C.R. at 1838, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 449, 483.
21. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgo, Case 199/82,
[1983] E.C.R. 3595, 3612, 1 11, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658, 688.
22. The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, exparte Factortame Ltd., Case C213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, 2439, 1 21, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 16-17.
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make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissua23
sive.
As far as the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86 is concerned, the following elements of the law as it stands are important:
* Article 86 has direct effect. 24 Article 85(1) EEC has
direct effect where implementing regulations have
been enacted. 25 These articles now directly affect all
sectors of the economy.
" Provisions of block exception regulations have direct
26
effect.
* National courts are not "national authorities" within
the meaning of Article 89 of the EEC Treaty, 27 except
where national courts function as "national authorities" or where they review decisions of such national
authorities. Unlike "national authorities" national
courts are not barred from adjudicating disputes involving the enforcement of Article 85(1) or Article
86 against collusive or abusive conduct in respect of
2
which the Commission has opened proceedings.
" Block exemption regulations are binding on national
courts in the sense that national courts may not modify the scope of block exemption regulations.2 9 The
23. Commission of European Communities v. Greece, Case 68/88, [1989] E.C.R.
2965, 2985, 24, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,396.
24. Belgische Radio en Televise and Soci6t6 belge des auteurs, compositeurs et
6diteurs v. SV SABAM and NV Fonior, Case 127/73 [1974] E.C.R. 51, 62, 1 16, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 238, 246 [hereinafter BRT v. SABAM]; Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver
Line Reisebfiro Gmbh v. Zentrale zur BekAmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V., Case
66/86 [1989] E.C.R. 803, 848, 33, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 95,219.
25. Minist46re public v. Lucas Asjes, Joined Cases 209-213/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1457,
1470, 1 68, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 173, 219, 68.
26. SA Fonderies Roubaix-Wattrelos v. Soci6t6 nouvelle des Fonderies A. Roux and
Soci6t6 des FonderiesJOT, Case 63/75 [1976] E.C.R. 111, 118, 111, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R.
538, 548.
27. See EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 89, 298 U.N.T.S. at 49-50 (demonstrating
that national authority not cited in Article 89).
28. See BRT v. SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, 62 16, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
238, 246; Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekimpfung unlauteren
Wettbewerb, Case 66/86 [1989] E.C.R. 803,848, 33, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,396.
29. Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bru AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935,
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210 [hereinafter Delimitis].
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fact that an agreement does not fulfil the conditions
of a block exemption regulation, however, does not
mean that it is therefore prohibited by Article 85(1).
on national
" Individual exemptions are binding
30
courts; comfort letters are not.
" Where an agreement prohibited by Article 85 (1) has
not been notified, exemptions are as a rule not possible. A national court can thus declare such agreement void without the risk of a subsequent conflicting exemption decision by the Commission.3 '
On the following aspects, no case law exists on the implication of other actions of the Commission on a national court.
* A "negative clearance."3 2
" The rejection by the Commission of a complaint. In
a letter by which it rejects a complaint following the
guidelines set out in Automec S.r.l. v. E.C. Commission,
Joined Cases T-24/90 & T-28/90 ("Automec II"),33 the
Commission is not bound to express an opinion on
the substance of the complaint (unless the action is
within its exclusive powers, such as the withdrawal of
an exemption),. 4
In other words, the Commission does not need to make a
prima facie finding of an infringement. Instead, the Commission may and can assume that the alleged infringement is established for the purpose of assessing whether the infringementjustifies the initiation of a proceeding for the Community interest.
Examples of factors to be considered include: "the importance
of the alleged infringement for the functioning of the common
market," "the likelihood of finding an infringement" and "the
30. Cf NV L'Or~al and SA L'Or~al v. PVBA De Nieuwe AMCK, Case 31/80, C1980]
E.C.R. 3775, 3792-93, 11 22 & 23, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 254..
31. Delimitis, [1991] E.C.R at 1-993, 1 52, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R at 253.
13 (4th ed.,
32. Thinam Jakob-Siebert, 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 1987,
Baden-Baden 1992) (discussing Article 87). Many writers consider that national courts
are not bound by a "negative clearance." See id. at 1988 n.104. Contra Dominique Berlin, L'application du droit communautairede la concurrencepar les autoritisfranfaises, 27 RVUE TRIMEMsrIELLE DE DRorr EUROPtEN 379,

126 (1991).

33. Automec S.r.l. v. E.C. Commission, Joined Cases T-24/90 & T-28/90, [1992]
E.C.R. 2223, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Automec II].
34. BJ. Drijber, Note, Case T-24/90, Automec S.r.l. v. Commission, Judgement of the
Court of First Instance of 18 September 1992, 30 COMMON Micr. L. REv. 1237 (1993).
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scope of
the investigation that would be required for that pur5
3

pose."

* A decision by the Commission finding that a given
practice or conduct infringes Article 85 (1) or Article
86.36

In Stergios Delimitis v. HenningerBrdu A G, Case G-234/89 ("Delimitis"), the Court refers in an obiter dictum to the risk of national courts making decisions that conflict inter alia with those
taken by the Commission in the implementation of Articles
85(1) and 86. The Court stated that "such... conflicting decisions would be contrary to the general principle of legal certainty."3 7 In the Notice, the Commission considers that national
courts are not formally bound by a decision issued by the Commission on the agreement, decision or concerted practice at is38
sue.

* A "settlement."3 9
A fairly important number of cases are settled by the Commission. In a number of cases, the Commission terminated, sus-

pended, or decided not to open proceedings as a result of commitments entered into by parties.' Although the "Community
interest" may be served by this informal competition policy, the
interests of third parties may not be satisfied.
35. Automec II, [1992] E.C.R. 2223, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 479.
36. See Helmuth Schr6ter, 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 32, at
1493-94, 1 162. Most writers take the view that such decisions are "declaratory". Id.; see

Jakob-Siebert, supra note 32, at 1494 n.612. Other writers consider that such decisions
are binding on national courts. See e.g., Berlin supra note 32, at 421, 126.
37. Delimitis, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 1-992, 47, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R.
210, 251-52.
38. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 8, 1 20. "Such statements [a decision,
opinion, or other official statement issued by an administrative authority and in particular by the Commission] provide national courts with significant information for reaching a judgment, even if they are not formally bound by them." Id.
39. COMMISSION TWENrY-SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 83, 126 (1993).
According to the XXII Report on Competition Policy, 553 cases were "settled" because
the agreements were no longer in force, their impact was too slight, the complaint had
become moot or because the investigation had not revealed any anti-competitive practice. Id.
40. See Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Undertakings in EEC Competition Law in PROCEDURE
AND ENFORCEMENT IN E.C. AND U.S. COMPETITION LAw, supra note 8, at 66 (discussing
Commission's decisions to suspend proceedings in light of undertakings by parties).
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II. THE NOTICE
Among the topics covered by the Notice the following de41
serve a closer analysis: the Commission's enforcement policy,
the Commission's views on the application of Articles 85 and 86
by national courts,42 and the cooperation between national
courts and the Commission.43
A. The Commission's Enforcement Policy
The Commission restates views put forward in Automec II on
priorities: these are to focus on notifications, complaints and
own initiative proceedings having particular political, economic
or legal significance for the EC.4 4 According to the Commission,
a sufficient Community interest does not exist in examining a
case "when the plaintiff is able to secure adequate protection of
his rights before the national courts."4"
1. The Respective Functions of the Commission and
National Courts
The view of the Commission's function - safeguarding the
public interest of the Community4 6 - as opposed to the national courts' function - safeguarding the rights of private individuals4 7 - is obviously too "black and white."4 The Commission appears to recognize the lack of a precise division between
the functions of the Commission and the national courts since it
accepts implicitly that there is sufficient Community interest
where adequate protection of private parties' rights is not available in national courts.4 9
In Automec II while making the distinction between the respective functions of the Commission and of national courts the
Court of First Instance stated:
In this context the question for the Court is whether the
41. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 7-8.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 9-11.
44. Id. at 7, 14.
45. Id. 15.
46. Id. at 6, 4.
47. Id.
48. See Drijber, supra note 34, at 1244-49 (discussing European Community interest and conditions for referring complainant to national court).
49. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 7, 15.
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Commission was right, in this particular case, to conclude

that there was not sufficient Community interest in pursuing
the examination of the matter on the ground that the applicant... could also submit to [the Italian] courts the question
of whether BMW Italia's distribution system was compatible
with Article 85(1) EEC."5 °

It would thus seem that the availability of a remedy in national
courts is an element to be considered by the Commission when
assessing the Community interest. On the other hand, the public interest is an element that national courts are allowed to take
into account and, in certain cases, are required to take into account.
What exactly is meant by "adequate protection of his [private parties'] rights in national courts,"5 1 and how far the Com-

mission should go in examining such protection are open questions. In addition, the question of the Commission's obligation
to investigate a case if it were to find that no available remedies
existed in national courts remains unanswered. In such a hypothetical case, the Commission would probably be bound to act.
The Commission has the necessary powers and there would be
no other course of action open to private parties.52
2. Effect of the Rejection of a Complaint
The Notice states that national courts should ascertain
"whether the agreement, decision or concerted practice has already been the subject of a decision, opinion or other official
statement issued by... the Commission." 53 While not binding
on national courts, such statements provide them with "significant information for reaching a judgement."54
According to the guidelines set forth in Automec II, when
rejecting a complaint, the Commission is bound to evaluate the
factual and legal aspects of the complaint. 55 As already pointed
out, the Commission could very well reject a complaint on the
50. Automec II, Joined Cases T-24/90 & T-28/90, [1992] E.C.R. 2223, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. at 479.
51. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 7,
15.
52. In such a case there is a clear analogy with anti-dumping and anti-subsidy com-

plaints, where the only remedy available to private parties is action by the Commission.
53. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 8, 1 20.
54. Id.
55. Automec II, Joined Cases T-24/90 & T-28/80, [1992] E.C.R. 2223, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. at 478,
79.
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grounds of absence of Community interest without expressing
prima facie views on the substantive merits of the complaint.
There are obviously two sides to the question whether the
Commission should express such views. If it does not, the Commission loses a chance to ensure enforcement in line with its
interpretation of the law. If it does, the defendant in the national court starts with a handicap if the national court considers
this as "significant information for reaching a judgement."5 6 If
the Commission expresses prima facie views on the substantive
merits of the complaint, it ought not to do so without hearing
the respondent.
B. Commission Views on the Application of Articles 85 and 86 by
National Courts
There are two different concerns underlying the Notice: (1)
encouraging more enforcement by national courts, and (2)
avoiding decisions that may conflict with those taken or envisaged by the Commission."' The Notice, which is partly analytical
and partly exhortative, often reflects these two concerns simultaneously. Rather than trying to distinguish these two concerns, it
seems appropriate to examine the Notice itself.
1. Enforcement of Article 85(1)
The Notice deals with a series of cases that involve the risk
of inconsistent decisions. The Commission draws on certain
legal principles derived from the case law of the Court of Justice
that would permit the avoidance of inconsistent decisions. As to
the substance:
national courts should ascertain whether the agreement, decision or concerted practice has already been the subject of a
decision, opinion or other official statement issued by an administrative authority and in particular by the Commission.
Such statements provide national courts with significant information for reaching ajudgement, even if they are not formally bound by them.5"
The above statement probably reflects the law as it stands.
Private parties, however, find it difficult to comply with the
56. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 8,

20.

57. Id. at 10, 34 and at 8, 1 18.
58. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 8,

20.
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law as interpreted in such decisions, opinions or other official
statements of the Commission. The law is particularly confusing
where "comfort letters" are concerned.5 9 While it is true that in
the Perfume cases' the Court of Justice stated that the type of
comfort letter that was in question did not bind national courts,
the Commission should have drawn certain conclusions from its
reliance on comfort letters. The Commission confirmed that it
intends (as it is in fact doing already now) to use comfort letters
as a rule to dispose of notifications in cases that have no Community interest.6 1 Would it be so shocking to say that the Commission has come to the conclusion that comfort letters ought to
be binding on national courts?
One may wonder whether there is not some inconsistency in
the stand taken in the Perfume cases and in the Notice. On the
one hand, national courts may not apply Article 85(3), 8, but
on the other, they ought to take Article 85(3) type comfort letters into account. 62 Hopefully, the Court of Justice will be prepared in an appropriate case to draw the logical conclusions
from its obiter dictum in Delimitis, where it stated that "[s]uch
conflicting decisions would be contrary to the ... principle of
legal certainty .... .63
Regarding procedure, the Notice recalls the following existing solutions:
(1) where the Commission has initiated a proceeding,
national courts may stay their proceedings while awaiting the outcome of the Commission's action;64
(2) national courts may stay proceedings and seek the
65
Commission's views;
(3) national courts may submit questions for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice;6 6
(4) when national courts find that the conditions for
applying Article 85(1) or Article 86 are not met, they
59. See SA Lancbme & Cosparfance Nederland BV v. Etos BV and Albert Heyn
Supermart BV, Case 99/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2511, 2533,
60. Id.

11, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 43.

61. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 7, 1 14.
62. Id. at 9, 25.
63. Delimitis, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935,1-992, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210,252,
1 47.
64. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 8, 1 22.

65. Id.
66. Id.
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should pursue their proceedings even if there has been
a notification to the Commission;67 and
(5) when national courts find that the conditions for
applying Article 85(1) or Article 86 are met, they must
rule that the conduct at issue infringes EC competition
68
law and take the appropriate measures.
As to the first potential solution, it is doubtful that national
courts would stay proceedings on the ground that the Commission has initiated proceedings, except in the unlikely event that
the parties request them to do so. In addition, and this applies
to the second and third solutions as well, in many instances the
issue will arise in summary proceedings and national courts will
be even more reluctant to stay proceedings. One would probably have to convince a national court that an important question
of principle is involved and demonstrate that a stay of proceedings does not adversely affect the parties' interests. The second
solution raises another issue that will be considered when examining what the Notice has to say about cooperation between national courts and the Commission. As to the fifth solution, the
Notice does not state whether this concerns conduct that has
been reported to the Commission, or conduct against which the
Commission has initiated proceedings. In view of what is stated
in the first solution, the Commission probably meant that in the
latter case the national courts are not bound to find an infringement and take appropriate measures. The fifth solution also
raises another issue that concerns the application of Article

85(3).
2. Application of Article 85(3)
This is not the end of the story for national courts. National
courts must also verify whether the conduct at issue has been or
will be exempted by the Commission under Article 85(3). The
Notice examines a series of cases:
(a) the conduct at issue benefits from an individual exemption;6 9 national courts are bound by it;
(b) the conduct at issue falls within the scope of a
67. Id. at 8-9, 23.
68. Id. at 8, 20.
69. Id. at 9, 25.
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block exemption; 70 national courts are bound to
apply the block exemption regulation;
(c) there is a comfort letter stating that the conditions
for applying Article 85(3) have been met with respect to the conduct at issue; 71 national courts are
not bound by it but may take account of it "as a
factual element;"
(d) the agreement, decision or concerted practice has
not been notified to the Commission; an exemption is ruled out, except for agreements, etc....
that did not need to be notified; national courts
72
may decide that the agreement, etc .... is void;
(e) the agreement, decision or concerted practice has
been notified to the Commission and the Commission has not yet ruled on the notification; national
courts should (the Notice says "will") assess the
likelihood of an exemption being granted; 71 if a
national court takes the view that the conduct at
issue cannot be exempted by the Commission, it
"will" take the measures to comply with Article
85(1) and (2). If not, the national court should
suspend the proceedings while awaiting the Com74
mission's decision.
As to (c), reference is made to earlier comments on comfort
letters. As to (d), the Notice states that national courts may decide that the agreement is void. In view of the introducing paragraph (24), this point assumes that a national court finds that
the conduct at issue infringes Article 85(1). Except where the
agreement did not need to be notified, in such cases national
courts must decide that it is void under Article 85(2).
Point (e)
is obviously the most difficult one. It calls for two comments.
First, it requires the national courts to second-guess the Commission. The Notice attempts to deal under the heading "Cooperation Between National Courts and Commission" with the difficulties that national courts may face in engaging in such an exer70. Id. 1 26.
71. Id. 1 25.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1
1
1

28.
29.
30.
28.
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cise. 71 The views of the Commission on this cooperation are
somewhat optimistic. Second, in the event that a national court
considers the conduct exemptible, apart from the reluctance of
national courts to stay proceedings, the Notice here runs again
into the contradiction between the view that national courts may

not apply Article 85(3) and the desire that they should take account of comfort letters, as the Commission's stated intention is
to dispose of notifications by comfort letters, except in cases
presenting a Community interest. 77
This contradiction can only be overcome if the Commission
is prepared to issue formal exemption decisions in the cases referred to under (e). According to that hypothesis, however, the
Commission would have to act more quickly than it usually does.
The Commission has at least attempted to give priority to cases
that are the subject of national proceedings and in which national courts have stayed proceedings to request information.7"
C. Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission
According to the Notice, national courts can ask the Commission for information.7 9 The types of information available
are discussed below.
1. Information of a Procedural Nature
National courts may request the following information: (1)
has there been a notification? (2) Has the Commission initiated
a proceeding? (3) Has the Commission taken a position by way
of decision or comfort letter? (4) How much time will the Commission need to grant or refuse an exemption?8 0
2. Information of a Legal Nature
The Notice contemplates the possibility for national courts
"[to] consult the Commission on points of law."'
For example,
the national courts may pose the following questions: (1) what is
the Commission's customary practice in relation to the EC law at
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 10, 1 37.
Id. at 7, 1 14.
Id. at 10, 37.
Id. 39.
Id. 37.
Id. 38.
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issue? (2) When is there effect on trade between Member
States? (3) When is there an appreciable restriction of competition? (4) The Notice even contemplates an "interim opinion" of
the Commission on whether a contested agreement, decision or
concerted practice is exemptible. 2
3. Information of a Factual Nature
According to the Notice, national courts can obtain statistics, market studies and economic analyses from the Commis83
sion.
4. Some Comments
These desired forms of cooperation deserve some comments. First, the legal basis for this cooperation on the part of
the Commission lies in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty as interpreted
in the first order in J.J. Zwartveld & Others.8 4 The Commission's
duty to communicate documents to national courts85 is qualified
by the interest of the Community. 6 The Commission's commitment to cooperate is further qualified in the Notice by "the general principle of sound administrative practice"8 7 and in particular by the Commission's duty not to disclose information of a
confidential nature. 88
Second, such requests for information may raise due process issues. The Commission attempts to account for this in the
Notice by undertaking "not [to] accede to requests for information unless they come from a national court, either directly, or
indirectly through parties which have been ordered by the court
concerned to provide certain information."8 9 In the latter case,
the Commission also undertakes "to ensure that its answer
reaches all the parties to the proceedings."9" The Notice does
not, however, say anything about the conditions in which the
Commission formulates its reply. In particular, where a national
82. Id.
83. Id. 40.
84. JJ. Zwartveld & Others, Case C-2/88

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Imm,

[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 457.

Commission Notice, supra note 1,at 8, 22.
Id. 1 25-26.
Id., supra note 1, at 10, 41.
Id. 1 42.
Id. at 11, 1 42.
Id.
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court "consults" the Commission on points of law and seeks the
Commission's interim opinion on the exemptibility of an agreement, the Commission will endeavor to provide the national
court with a useful reply. In such cases, the Commission ought
not submit its reply to the national court without having heard
the concerned parties in Commission proceedings. The analogy
to preliminary ruling proceedings in the Court ofJustice is obvious. The argument that, unlike preliminary rulings by the Court
of Justice, such "opinions" of the Commission are not binding
on national courts is not very convincing. What would be the
point of such opinions if the Commission does not expect that
they will be followed by national courts?
Third, the Commission, on this point as well, expects more
from national courts than they may be able or willing to do. The
Notice refers dutifully to the limits of national procedural law.9 1
It is, however, there that many obstacles lie.
Normally, in civil proceedings in EC Member States, the
parties are in the driver's seat; they define the scope of the disputes before the court, and courts may not raise issues on their
own motion. There is usually a qualified exception to this principle where national courts find that disputes brought before
them involve the application of rules of public policy.9 2 National
courts usually must hear the parties to the dispute on the application of such rules of public policy. It remains to be seen
whether all national courts consider Articles 85(1) and 86 as
rules of public policy that they ought to raise on their own motion during the proceedings.
In addition, to varying degrees, the role of civil courts is a
passive one as far as issues of fact are concerned. Normally, they
are not allowed to bring into the proceedings facts that the parties did not submit to them.93 This means that where a national
court would on its own motion include in proceedings about an
agreement before it the issue of the compatibility of such agree91. Id. at 10, 37.
92. This practice is fairly common in the EC Member States and is reflected interalia in Article 7 of the Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. See
BAsic DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 669-70 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., Dordrecht, 1990) (reprinting Convention).
93. See, e.g., Marcel Storme & Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, L'Activisme du juge Der
richterlicheActivismus, IX World Conference on ProceduralLaw, 1 GEN. REP. 405, 431 (Coimbra, 1991).
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ment with Article 85 (1), it could probably only do so on the basis
of the facts as submitted by the parties. In such a case, it is
highly doubtful that the national court could on its own initiative seek from the Commission facts necessary to establish the
effect of the contested agreement on trade between EC Member
States. Moreover, in many EC Member States' legal systems,
judges are not allowed to seek views on points of law from third
parties.9 4
CONCLUSION
Quite obviously, a mere notice must take the law as it stands;
it cannot change it. One can hardly expect a notice to contribute substantially to resolving the legal obstacles that stand in the
way of effective enforcement of Article 85(1) and Article 86 in
national courts. This being said, one would have expected a less
conservative stance of the Commission on comfort letters and a
more enlightened interpretation of the more recent case law.
Some of the obstacles to effective enforcement are inherent
in the law as it stands, providing for enforcement by national
courts operating within the framework of national legal systems. 95 In theory, EC legislation could be enacted making improvement of judicial enforcement possible without putting the
system of division of powers into question. If no such legislation
is enacted, developments in the case law of the Court of Justice
could move things in the right direction.
More enforcement by national courts, if national courts are
able and willing to act as the Notice suggests under the heading
96
"Cooperation between national courts and the Commission,"
will paradoxically lead to more work for the Commission,
though this would be the case to a lesser extent if national courts
were granted the power to grant exemptions.
More effective enforcement through more application by
national courts, which probably implies that such national courts
also have the power to grant exemptions, is at odds with more
consistent enforcement, certainly under the law as it stands.
Some take the view that it is impossible to achieve "decentraliza94. Id. at 476.
95. See supra text at 337-340 and accompanying notes (discussing European Community law enforcement by national courts).
96. Commission Notice, supra note 1, at 9.
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tion" while at the same time preserving uniform application.9 7
In this respect, one should bear in mind that enforcement of EC
competition law, especially where it involves granting of exemptions, implies that the assessment of sometimes complex economic facts, decisions of national courts are thus less amenable
to the uniforming effects of the preliminary ruling procedure.
At any rate, national courts will be reluctant, assuming that
they may do so under their procedural rules, to seek opinions
from the Commission.9" They would be less reluctant to seek
opinions from a court - and they would face fewer legal obstacles - if such opinions were given more promptly than Court of
Justice judgments on preliminary questions. Giving such a role
to the Court of First Instance would make sense in view of its
jurisdiction for direct appeals in competition matters.9 9
It has been argued that more effective enforcement could
be ensured if more cases were devolved to national competition
authorities. 10 0 Referrals without further ado are questionable solutions. National competition authorities may already enforce
EC competition rules provided that the Commission has not initiated proceedings. National competition authorities are not,
however, bound to apply EC competition rules. There may be
an opportunity to clarify that the issue in relation to a Commission decision referring cases to a national competition authority. 101 The record of national competition law is not very encouraging. 12 Even though several EC Member States have enacted
national competition rules mirroring EC rules, there remain differences on policy and on enforcement between Member States
97. Drijber, supra note 34, at 1248-49.
98. See supra text at 335 and accompanying notes (discussing reluctance to address
judicial organization in Member States within EC framework).
99. See supra text at 335-36 and accompanying notes (discussing jurisdiction of EC
courts).
100. Alan Riley, More Radicalism, Please: The Notice on Co-operation between National

Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 3 EUROPEAN
CoMPETrnON L. lEv. 91, 94 (1993). For a similar proposition, see Mario Siragusa, The
Lowering of the Thresholds: An Opportunity to Harmonize Merger Control, 4 EUR. COMPETI-

L. REv. 139 (1993).
101. It concerns some of the SACEM cases: BENIM v. Commission and Tremblay
v. Commission, O.J. C 43/25 (1993) (not yet reported). The requests for a preliminary
ruling in B.A.B. Le Club 7 and in LeDyat have been withdrawn and were removed from
the Court of Justice's registry on 14 May and 8 June 1993.
102. See Berlin, supra note 32, at 13; Roth, supra note 9, at 7, and accompanying
text (discussing application of Community Law in West Germany).
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and between Member States and the Commission. These differences are bound to inhibit both effective and consistent enforcement of EC competition rules.
In order to ensure consistency, it has been suggested that
the Commission retain a guidance and supervisory role as well as
"the ability to 'pull in' any particular case." 10 3 In light of the
half-baked solution that the EC Council adopted with respect to
Commission supervision of enforcement of government procurement rules, 10 4 one should not entertain illusions about a
genuine sort of "guardianship" by the Commission over national
competition authorities being accepted.

103. Riley, supra note 100, at 95.
104. Council Directive No. 89/665, O.J. L 395/33 (1989).

